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THE EFFECTS OF MEDICARE PAYMENT
CHANGES ON NURSING HOME STAFFING
D A I F E N G H E
P E T E R M C H E N R Y
J E N N I F E R M . M E L L O R
ABSTRACT
In light of persistent shortcomings in nursing home care quality and evidence that lower
nurse staffing levels could be harmful to residents, we examine whether staffing levels are
affected by changes in Medicare reimbursement rates. We exploit a 2006 change in Medi-
care’s methodology for adjusting provider payments for geographic differences in costs, a
change that generated plausibly exogenous variation in nursing facility reimbursement
rates. Our method compares facilities with higher and lower shares of Medicare resident
days, which were differentially exposed to the payment changes we examine. Using panel
data on US nursing homes from 2003 through 2009, we find that higher Medicare pay-
ments increased nurse staffing hours per resident day. Additional results suggest that
changes in Medicare payments did not affect other measures of quality.
KEYWORDS: Medicare payment reform, nursing home staffing, skilled nursing facility
prospective payment system, hospital wage index, geographic realignment
JEL CLASSIF ICAT ION: H5, I11, I13, I18
I. Introduction
The quality of nursing home care in the United States has been a long-standing concern, as
evidenced by numerous academic studies and government reports (e.g., Institute of Med-
icine 1986, 1996; Mor et al. 2009). In the past 20 years, for example, the US Government
Accountability Office has issued more than 20 reports on shortcomings in either nursing
home care or the government oversight of nursing homes (USGovernment Accountability
Office 2018). A 2014 report, for example, finds that one-third of short-stay nursing facility
residents experience adverse events or harms such asmedication errors, delays in receiving
necessary care, and dehydration, and that half of these events are preventable (US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General 2014). Nursing home
quality is especially important in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, which together
finance nearly 60 percent of US spending on nursing facility care, for a total of $87.9 billion
in 2017 (Centers for Medicare andMedicaid Services 2018a). One important dimension of
nursing facility quality is the level of nursing staff, and a large body of research shows that
higher nursing staff levels are associated with reduced cases of infection, dehydration,
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weight loss, and pressure sores; lower mortality; and improvements in physical function-
ing (e.g., Bostick et al. 2006; Castle 2008; and Dellefield et al. 2015). Additionally, research
using instrumental variables methods finds that nursing staff levels have a causal effect on
other measures of facility quality (Lin 2014).
While nursing staff levels can be directly impacted by regulations such as minimum
staffing requirements, they may also be indirectly impacted by administratively set reim-
bursement rates in public insurance programs. However, identifying the causal effect of
Medicaid or Medicare reimbursement on nurse staffing is a challenge. In the Medicaid pro-
gram, where reimbursement rates are set by states, rate increases may be a response to in-
creased minimum staffing requirements or higher facility staffing costs. A similar concern
pertains to studies examining Medicare payment rates, since differences in Medicare pay-
ment rates across areas reflect differences in operating costs (i.e., local area wage differences),
which themselves affect staffing levels. Some studies have examined changes in staffing
following Medicare’s adoption of a prospective payment system (PPS) for skilled nursing
facilities (SNFs) in 1998 (e.g., Konetzka et al. 2004), but the SNF PPS changed the payment
methodology, not just the payment levels, making it hard to identify the effect of reim-
bursement rates on staffing.
Our study adds to this literature by using a novel strategy to identify the causal effects of
facility-specific Medicare payment changes on nursing home staffing. Specifically, we ex-
amine a one-time plausibly exogenous change in the hospital wage index (HWI), an area-
level adjustment to SNF payments. Prior to fiscal year 2006, SNF payments were adjusted
by a hospital wage index defined for local areas using metropolitan statistical areas or
MSAs; from October 2005 on, the wage index was defined for areas using core-based sta-
tistical areas or CBSAs (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2016; Medicare Pro-
spective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2007). As
a result, the HWI changed for more than 8,500 nursing facilities nationwide; for 8 percent
of facilities, those changes exceeded 3 percentage points. The HWI changes translated to
increases or decreases in the per diemMedicare SNF payment rates, and, unlikemost other
year-to-year changes in the HWI, they provide an important source of payment variation
that is unrelated to facility decisions or market factors. We use this quasi-experiment to
examine the causal effects of Medicare payment changes on registered nurse (RN) hours
per resident day, licensed practical nurse (LPN) hours per resident day, and total direct
care staff hours per resident day. Our methodology also compares facilities with higher
and lower shares of Medicare resident days, which were differentially exposed to the pay-
ment adjustments.
We find that increases in Medicare payments increased staffing hours per resident day
at facilities. In particular, a 5 percent increase in Medicare payments increased RN hours
per resident day by 9.01 percent (and LPN hours per resident day by 3.24 percent) in fa-
cilities with 10 percent of resident days paid by Medicare relative to facilities with no Med-
icare patients. We find no evidence that changes in Medicare payments affected other mea-
surable dimensions of nursing home quality. Ourfindings are important given long-standing
concerns about nursing home quality and the more recent attention on staffing deficiencies
in particular. Moreover, our findings have implications for policies that changed real Medi-
care payments to nursing facilities as part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) as well as
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for payment policy recommendations from the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC).
II. Background and Literature Review
Both Medicare and Medicaid pay for a significant share of all nursing home care. Accord-
ing to 2016 data, Medicaid covers the cost for 62 percent of all nursing home residents
while Medicare is the primary payer for another 14 percent (Kaiser Family Foundation,
n.d.). Medicare covers short-term SNF stays following Part A covered inpatient hospital-
izations of three days or more; residents covered by Medicare receive skilled nursing ser-
vices, which are services ordered by physicians and provided by RNs, LPNs, or physical
therapists. Medicaid typically covers longer-term stays for residents needing custodial care
and assistance with activities of daily living, such as dressing, bathing, and toileting. Med-
icaid reimbursement policies are determined by individual states subject to federal rules.
Medicare reimbursement follows federal guidelines under the SNF PPS.
Only a few prior studies have examined the effects of Medicare payment changes on
nursing home staffing.1 Using data from 1996 to 2000, Konetzka et al. (2004) report that
the introduction of the SNF PPS in 1998 had negative effects on the sum of RN and LPN
hours. However, the SNF PPS had differing impacts on facility payments, with some facil-
ities experiencing increases in payments and others experiencing decreases (White 2005).
White (2005) uses simulated facility-specific payment changes to disentangle the effects of
changes in payment levels, and reports that payment increases raised direct care staffing.
However, the primary source of variation in the simulated payments is year-by-year revi-
sions in the HWI routinely implemented by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices (CMS) to reflect fluctuations of local labor market conditions (i.e., average wages),
which are likely to be correlated with facilities’ supply decisions. Hence, the payment
changes inWhite (2005) are potentially related to nurse staffing through local labormarket
channels like the ease of recruiting nurses, in addition to the direct payment channel. Re-
lated to these prior works, Kaestner and Guardado (2008) study hospital nurse staffing lev-
els in response to hospital geographic reclassifications that increase the HWI and thus the
Medicare payment rate. In contrast to the nursing facility studies, they find that higher
Medicare payments reduced nursing staff levels at hospitals.
A number of other studies have examined the impact of Medicaid payment rates on
nursing home staffing using various study designs. Some longitudinal studies using state
fixed-effects models find that increases in Medicaid payments are associated with higher
staffing (Grabowski et al. 2004; Feng et al. 2008). Because changes in state payment rates
may be a response to higher facility costs or part of cost-containment efforts, other studies
have employed instrumental variables methods to deal with endogeneity of this type. Har-
rington, Swan, and Carrillo (2007) use such an approach in a national sample of facilities
from 2002, and find that increases in state Medicaid payments increase RN hours.
1 In addition, Zinn et al. (2008) examine the effect of Medicare PPS on administrative nurse staffing, or
time spent by nurses in activities other that direct care giving, in the nursing home setting. That study finds
that the introduction of Medicare PPS increased administrative nurse staffing.
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Hackmann (2019) uses exogenous variation in Medicaid reimbursement rates across
Pennsylvania nursing homes in 2000–02 and finds that a 10 percent increase in Medicaid
rates increases skilled nurse staffing per resident by 8.7 percent.
In summary, prior studies on Medicare payment rate changes find opposite-signed ef-
fects on staffing in hospitals and nursing homes. The literature on Medicaid payment and
staffing generally finds that higher payments increase staffing, but these studies vary con-
siderably in terms of identification strategies, and the most recent work in this area uses a
single-state setting. Our study uses national data from a more recent time period to exam-
ine the effect of Medicare payment changes on nursing facility staffing. Our key contribu-
tion is the use of an improved strategy for identifying the causal effects of Medicare pay-
ment changes on facility staffing, as we describe in the next section.
III. Nursing Facility Price Shocks
A. MEDICARE PAYMENT TO NURSING FACILITIES
For patients enrolled in fee-for-service Medicare, Medicare reimburses facilities according
to the SNF PPS, which was introduced in 1998 and replaced the prior cost-based system of
payment. Under the PPS, facility payments from Medicare are determined by daily base
rates defined separately for urban and rural facilities and are updated annually based on
nationwide inflation. Starting in 2012 and under the ACA, the annual updates to the base
payments are reduced to account for economy-wide productivity increases; these “produc-
tivity adjustment factors” in Medicare payment systems are the source of substantial sav-
ings in the ACA (Capretta and Antos 2015).
To account for differences in labor costs across the United States, a portion of the base
rate is adjusted by the hospital wage index (HWI) in the area in which the facility is located
(MedPAC 2018). In 2006, which is the midpoint of our sample period, 76 percent of the
base rate was adjusted by the HWI (Medicare Prospective Payment System and Consoli-
dated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2006). Figure 1 shows the relationship between
the per diem SNF payment and the HWI, and equation 1 expresses it algebraically:
PPS 5 HWI # 0:76 # bU rð Þ 1 0:24 # bU rð Þ (1),
where bU (r) represents the base payment adjusted for the case mix of the patient; this base
payment differs by the urban/rural status of the SNF.2
The HWI is calculated by CMS as the ratio of the area’s average hourly hospital wage to
the national average hourly hospital wage, where average hourly wages are derived from
2 The base payment is adjusted for case mix using resource utilization groups (RUGs). In 2019, there were
66 different RUGs, which reflect the varying resources needed to treat patients with different therapy and
nursing needs, medical conditions, and cognitive and physical functioning (MedPAC 2018). Effective Octo-
ber 2019, CMS will use a new case mix system called PDPM or Patient-Driven Payment Model (Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services 2018b). Effective October 2018, CMS adopted the SNF Value-Based Pur-
chasing (VBP) Program, which adds bonuses or subtracts penalties based on each facility’s 30-day all-cause
hospital readmission rate (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2018c).
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data on wages, salaries, benefits, and hours reported by short-term acute care hospitals
paid under the inpatient PPS on their annual Cost Reports (MaCurdy et al. 2009). Thus,
facilities located in areas where hospital wages exceed the national average have wage index
values greater than 1, and their payments are adjusted upward; facilities located in rela-
tively low-cost areas have HWI values below 1 and receive lower payments.
B. GEOGRAPHIC REALIGNMENT
Since the HWI is an area-level adjustment, CMS must also establish how geographic areas
are defined. Prior to federal fiscal year (FY) 2006, CMS defined the areas using metropol-
itan statistical areas; that is, the wage index value was based on costs in the MSA, and all
facilities in the same MSA had the same HWI value applied to their payment determina-
tions. Then, starting with federal FY 2007 (on October 1, 2006), CMS used core-based sta-
tistical areas in defining and applying HWI adjustments. During the transitional year of FY
2006 (between October 1, 2005, and September 30, 2006), CMS used a blended HWI ad-
justment equal to the average ofMSA-based andCBSA-basedwage index values (Medicare
Prospective Payment System and Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2007).
Under both MSA and CBSA geographies, regions outside of a metropolitan/urban area
are grouped into one of 50 “rest-of-state” areas (i.e., one for each state).
The switch from MSAs to CBSAs had two effects on Medicare payments to facilities.
First, because it altered the composition of the areas, the geographic realignment changed
the value of the area-level HWI applied to facility per diem payment rates for thousands of
facilities. For example, numerous facilities inside relatively low-wageMSAs (with relatively
low HWIs) instead became part of higher-wage CBSAs, leading to increases in the HWI,
while many other facilities in relatively high-wage MSAs become part of lower-wage
CBSAs (leading to decreases in HWI). Figure 2 shows these HWI changes at the county
level; for each county, the map displays the change in HWI following the switch from
MSAs to CBSAs in the wage index calculation. Geographic regions across the United States
experienced both increases and decreases of varying magnitudes. Second, the switch from
FIGURE 1. Illustration of the relationship between the HWI and the Medicare
SNF PPS payment. Source: Adapted from MedPAC (2018).
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MSAs to CBSAs affected base rates for a small group of facilities. In some cases, facilities
previously designated as rural were designated as urban (and vice versa); since base pay-
ments are different for rural facilities and urban facilities, base payments either fell or rose
in such instances.
Our identification strategy focuses on the first component of the Medicare payment
change—the change in the HWI for individual SNFs resulting solely from the geographic
realignment. In doing so, we exclude the small group of facilities for which the urban/rural
designation switched (813 facilities). The reason for this exclusion is that under the geo-
graphic realignment when a facility switched from rural to urban designation (or vice versa),
both the base payment and the HWI changed. Base payments differ by resource utilization
group, so information on the RUG distribution at the facility level would be necessary to
calculate payment changes for facilities that switch between urban and rural designation.
Since the facility-specific RUG distribution is not easy to measure and the switchers ac-
count for a small number of facilities, we focus on the vast majority of facilities whose ru-
ral/urban classification remained unchanged. Importantly, these changes in theHWI led to
changes in Medicare facility payments that were independent from the choices made by
facilities and from the market conditions that facilities face. Equation 2 defines the change
in the SNF PPS per diem rate relative to the initial rate (referred to as the “payment change”
for simplicity). Substituting equation 1 for PPS and simplifying, we can express the per-






0:76HWI0 1 1 2 0:76ð Þ (2).
For example, a facility whose HWI increased from 1.1 to 1.15 saw a 3.53 percent rise in the
per diem payment rate, while a facility whose HWI fell from 0.95 to 0.90 saw a 3.95 percent
drop in the per diem rate (all else equal). Our identification strategy is similar to that of
Clemens and Gottlieb (2014), in that we use this geographic change in the application
of the wage index to examine provider responses to Medicare payment changes.
Figure 3 illustrates the effects that the geographic realignment had on the HWI values
for the nursing facilities in our sample. Each point represents a specific facility. The hor-
izontal axis shows each facility’s 2006 HWI when the MSA is used to assign the facility to
a market; the vertical axis shows the facility’s 2006 HWI when the CBSA is used. Points off
of the 45-degree line indicate changes in HWI values generated by the geographic realign-
ment, and thereby policy-induced changes in payment rates. Facilities across the whole
range of MSA-based HWI values experienced changes in the HWI, and those changes in-
cluded both increases and decreases. Using equation 2, we calculate the percentage change
in Medicare payment associated with the HWI change; the distribution of Medicare pay-
ment changes is reported in Table 1. Nearly two-thirds of facilities experienced changes
due to the policy, and some changes were quite large: 275 or 2.1 percent of nursing facilities
saw payment increases or decreases of more than 5 percent. Another 5.5 percent of facil-
ities experienced increases or decreases of more than 3 percent, and nearly 11 percent ex-
perienced increases or decreases ranging from 1 percent to 3 percent. These changes,
though appearing small in magnitude, are important for facility profit margins. MedPAC
(2017) estimated the average SNF profit margin to be 1.6 percent in 2015.
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TABLE 1. Geography-induced change in 2006 Medicare payment
Change in Medicare payment No. of nursing facilities Share of nursing facilities
Decreases
DPayment less than 20.05 140 1.1
DPayment in [20.05, 20.03) 326 2.5
DPayment in [20.03, 20.01) 874 6.6
DPayment in [20.01, 0) 3,735 28.3
No change 4,631 35.1
Increases
DPayment in (0, 0.01] 2,688 20.4
DPayment in (0.01, 0.03] 553 4.2
DPayment in (0.03, 0.05] 121 0.9
DPayment greater than 0.05 135 1
Total facilities 13,203 100
Note: Sample excludes government-owned and in-hospital nursing facilities and facilities with
missing data for RN hours per resident day and explanatory variables in the regressions.
FIGURE 3. HWI under MSA and CBSA definitions. The figure shows the
relationship between the MSA-based HWI and the CBSA-based HWI in 2006
for 13,023 nursing facilities. A color version of this figure is available online.
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The switch fromMSAs to CBSAs had differing effects on facilities located in urban and
rural areas, even those that did not switch from one designation to the other. For example,
some largeMSAs got split intomultiple CBSAs, and themost-urban of the newCBSAs saw
the highest HWI increases. We tested this systemically by regressing the 2006 county-level
HWI difference (the CBSA-based HWI minus the MSA-based HWI) on the county share
of the population living in urban areas, controlling for state fixed effects; the coefficient
estimate for county urban share was positive and significant. Therefore, to address the
possibility of differential trends across urban and rural areas that could contribute to dif-
ferences in staffing, we control for time-varying urban-rural differences in our model, as
we note below. Our estimates also account for persistent location differences with facility-
level fixed effects.
To the best of our knowledge, the present study is the first to exploit the plausibly ex-
ogenous variation in the HWI caused by Medicare’s shift from MSAs to CBSAs to study
the effects of Medicare payment on nursing home staffing. A few studies have examined
the effects of the HWI geography change on other health-care provider decisions. Mc-
Henry and Mellor (2018) use the same geographic change to test whether hospitals stra-
tegically game the wage index adjustment by paying higher wages to nurses. Shin (2019)
and He et al. (2020) use similar geographic realignments to examine the impacts of Med-
icare payment changes on the volume of care provided to Medicare patients by hospitals
and SNFs, respectively.3
IV. Conceptual Framework
In this section, we provide a simple theoretical framework for understanding the effects of
Medicare payment changes on SNF staffing decisions. Following Sloan (2000), we assume
that the facility maximizes the weighted sum of profits and quality of care. Revenue is de-
rived from two types of services, post-acute care (PA) and long-stay care (LS), the prices
of which (p) may differ. We assume that facilities take output prices as given, and that
the price of post-acute care is determined by Medicare reimbursement policy. Output
3 The nursing home setting offers a cleaner identification strategy compared with the hospital setting.
Hospitals can circumvent changes in the HWI that would otherwise reduce their payments by seeking geo-
graphic reclassification to a different area with a higher HWI. Additionally, hospitals can also receive a num-
ber of adjustments to the HWI. The rural floor provision holds that hospitals in urban areas within a state
cannot be assigned an HWI lower than the HWI used in rural areas. Under the out-migration adjustment,
CMS adjusts the wage index applied to hospital payments based on commuting patterns of hospital employ-
ees. The occupational mix adjustment adjusts the index based on the mix of hospital employees. Estimates
suggest that almost 40 percent of hospitals paid under the inpatient prospective payment system receive
some kind of adjustment or reclassification so that the wage index applied to payment calculations is differ-
ent from the index of their geographic location (Institute of Medicine 2012). In contrast, federal regulations
do not allow administrative adjustments to the HWI in the case of nursing facility payment, thus strength-
ening our ability to identify causal effects of payment changes (Medicare Prospective Payment System and
Consolidated Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2005a, 2005b, 2007).
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quantities are q and the level of staffing (i.e., labor input) is L.4Wages arew and are taken as
determined in a competitive labor market. Quality of care is n, which rises with staffing.




a½ pPAqPA Lð Þ 1 pLSqLS Lð Þ 2 wL 1 1 2 að Þn Lð Þ (3).









1 1 2 að Þ ∂n
∂L
5 0 (4).
An increase in staffing increases output quantity and thereby increases profit, but that
comes at a marginal cost of higher payroll. An increase in staffing also increases quality.
The facility chooses the optimal level of staffing to balance weighted marginal costs and
benefits.
Our empirical analysis estimates the effect of a Medicare reimbursement rate change
on staffing. In the framework above, an increase in pPA increases the marginal benefit of
post-acute services, which increases the marginal revenue product of staffing. The facility
would likely respond by increasing its staffing level. Conversely, a decrease in the reim-
bursement rate would decrease the marginal revenue product of staffing inputs and might
decrease the staffing level. However, it is possible that the facility independently values
quality of care enough to mitigate any reduction in staffing from reimbursement cuts. The
model incorporates such a mitigation with the possibility that the weight on profits (a)
is small, or the effect of staffing on quality of care ∂n=∂L is large.
Facilities vary in the share of total services provided to post-acute patients reimbursed
byMedicare. Our conceptual framework implies that if marginal labor inputs are used less
for post-acute than for long-stay patients, then the marginal product of labor for post-
acute services will be smaller than that for long-stay services (∂qPA=∂L < ∂qLS=∂L). In such
a case, the influence of Medicare reimbursement on staffing will be smaller. But for facil-
ities with a larger Medicare share, the influence of Medicare reimbursement changes on
staffing will be larger. This observation informs our identification strategy that compares
plausibly exogenous changes inMedicare reimbursement rates across facilities with higher
versus lower Medicare shares.
V. Estimation
To estimate the effects of Medicare SNF payment changes on nursing staff levels, we esti-
mate equation 5:
yit 5 a1DPaymenti #POSTt #Medicare Sharei 1 a2DPaymenti#POSTt
1 a3POSTt # Medicare Sharei 1 b1Xit 1 gi 1 tt 1 lst 1 εit (5),
4 In this conceptual framework, we assume that labor inputs are used interchangeably for post-acute and
long-stay care, rather than specializing in either type of care. This is consistent with the measures of facility-
level staffing available to us.
ð5Þ,
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where i denotes the facility and t denotes the time period. Our sample includes three years
prior to the FY 2006 change in the construction of theHWI (2003–05) and three years after
the change (2007–09), and we omit 2006, where an average of MSA-based HWI and
CBSA-based HWI was used. Our sample period ends in 2009 so that the implementation
of the ACA does not confound our analysis. The dependent variable, yit, is one of several
staffing measures, including RN hours per resident day (HPRD), LPN HPRD, and total
direct care staff HPRD. We define these in more detail in Section VI.
The key explanatory variable in the regression is the interaction of DPaymenti, POSTt,
andMedicare Sharei. DPaymenti is the percentage change in per diem Medicare payment
rates to SNF caused by the change in HWI, and calculated with equation 2. POSTt is a
binary variable indicating years after the realignment (2007–09).5 Medicare Sharei is the
facility-specific share of Medicare days, or the ratio of resident days paid by Medicare to
total resident days, defined for 2005, the calendar year prior to the geographic change.
The average Medicare share in our sample is 14.5 percent in 2005. This variable measures
the “exposure” of a facility to the Medicare payment change, as facilities with an initially
higher Medicare share are more heavily affected by Medicare payment changes than facil-
ities with an initially lower Medicare share.6 Thus, the estimate of a1 measures the differ-
ence in the effect of the payment change by facilities’ exposure to Medicare.7
We include a large number of controls in themodel.Xit represents a set of time-varying
facility and county traits. Time-varying facility traits include the number of certified beds
and indicator variables for whether the facility is part of a chain or is a nonprofit. Time-
varying county traits include nursing home beds per 1,000 residents age 65 and older,
home health agencies per 1,000 residents age 65 and older, shares of the county population
5 CMS uses the fiscal year and most of our other data sources are based on the calendar year (CY). Al-
though a given fiscal year runs fromOctober 1 of the past calendar year through September 31 of the current
calendar year, we do not think this misalignment poses a serious threat to our identification, as most of the
CY and FY overlap.
6 At the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we used a measure of Medicare revenue in the construction
of our key explanatory variable in equation 5, in place of the change in the Medicare payment rate interacted
with the Medicare share. This change facilitates the interpretation of the coefficient estimates. We estimated
these models and obtained results (available upon request) that are consistent with the main estimates from
equation 5. However, because the construction of facility-level Medicare revenue relies on a strong simpli-
fying assumption, we report results from using the triple interaction term in equation 5 as our main explan-
atory variable. Specifically, to construct facility-level Medicare per diem rates we need data on the facility’s
case mix of Medicare patients, among other measures. We are unable to measure the case mix of Medicare
patients in our data, so we used the facility-level average RUG as a proxy. This assumes that the facility-level
average RUG for all patients (short-stay Medicare patients and long-stay patients) is the same as the average
RUG for Medicare patients.
7 Our identification strategy relies on changes in HWI at the geographic level. While facilities in the same
location experienced a similar policy change, our strategy of measuring the facility’s exposure to the policy
change by its Medicare share allows us to exploit within-location variation in the policy change as well, since
nearby facilities with different Medicare shares were affected differentially by the policy. We confirmed in
our sample that a substantial share of the variation in our main independent variable occurs within geo-
graphic areas defined by hospital service areas (HSAs).
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that are female, African American, Hispanic, under age 65, and in poverty, the Medicare
Advantage penetration rate, and the employment-to-population ratio. In addition, Xit also
includes interactions between each of the year dummies and a measure of the share of the
county population residing in areas designated as urban. This allows for differential urban-
rural trends, since, as noted earlier, the impacts of the HWI geographic realignment had
differing effects on facilities located in urban and rural areas. To capture all time-invariant
factors at the facility level, such as geographic location and management style, we include
gi, a set of facility fixed effects. We include a set of year dummies (represented by tt) to pick
up annual changes in staffing affecting all facilities nationwide. lst represents a full set of
state-by-year dummy variables, which capture all factors that change at an annual level
and affect all nursing facilities in the same state the same way, such as state-specific mac-
roeconomic fluctuations, demographic trends, and policy changes. εit is the error term.
We estimate the model for Medicare/Medicaid certified nursing homes across the
United States.8 We exclude in-hospital facilities and government-owned facilities from
our sample since these facilities may differ in important ways from the rest of the market.9
As noted above, we also exclude 813 facilities whose designation as urban or rural switched
as a result of the geographic realignment. Those facilities experienced base rate shifts (be-
tween the rural- and urban-specific base rates) in addition to the HWI change. We weight
observations in the regressions by the number of Medicare/Medicaid certified beds. We
cluster the standard errors at the level of the unique MSA-CBSA pairs in our sample.
VI. Data
Our primary data source is LTCFocus.org.10 For the staffing measures we use, LTCFocus
draws from the Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR)/Certification and
Survey Provider Enhanced Reporting (CASPER) data. OSCAR/CASPER data are collected
by state agencies as part of annual certification inspections of nursing homes and aremain-
tained by CMS. We include three measures of staffing, each defined as hours per resident
day (HPRD): RN HPRD, LPN HPRD, and total direct care staff (DC) HPRD. DC staff
hours are defined as the sum of RN, LPN, and certified nursing assistant (CNA) hours.11
8 Because they are not included in LTCFocus.org, our main data source, facilities in Alaska andWashing-
ton, DC, are excluded.
9 For example, because of the close connection between hospital-based nursing homes and the hospitals
where the home is located, the former may consider both hospital and facility objectives, which will affect
responses to Medicare payment changes. The literature has often treated the freestanding nursing facilities
separately from the hospital-based nursing facilities (e.g., Konetzka et al. 2006;White 2005). Of all facilities in
2005, 6 percent were government owned and 9 percent were in-hospital facilities.
10 LTCFocus.org is produced by the Shaping Long-Term Care in America Project at Brown University,
funded in part by the National Institute on Aging (1P01AG027296).
11 In constructing these measures, LTCFocus converts CMS versions of the survey responses of facilities
into measures of the number of RN (or LPN or CNA) HPRD. In the process LTCFocus inspects the data for
implausible values and sets these variables to missing in certain cases, and imputes values for certain cases
when the facility’s data exhibit sizable variations from one year to the next (specifically when the staffing is
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We calculated the HWI change used to identify the payment changes from published
data in the Federal Register (Medicare Prospective Payment System and Consolidated
Billing for Skilled Nursing Facilities 2007). These data provide each county’s MSA assign-
ment, CBSA assignment, 2006 MSA-based wage index, and 2006 CBSA-based wage index.
DHWIi is defined as the 2006 CBSA-based HWI minus the 2006 MSA-based wage index,
and is used in equation 2 to calculate DPaymenti. We then merged these county-level data
to facilities in LTCFocus by county code.12
For the facility’s Medicare share in 2005, we used a variable from LTCFocus measuring
the share of SNF Medicare days out of the total number of nursing home days for all res-
idents in the facility in the calendar year. This variable was obtained from the Residential
History File (RHF), which is constructed from Medicare enrollment and claims data and
theMinimumData Set (MDS). Additional details on construction of the RHF are available
in Intrator et al. (2010).
We obtain facility-level data on ownership type, membership in a chain, and bed size
from annual Nursing Home Compare data.13 We extract county-level data on demo-
graphic and economic characteristics of the population, as well as hospital beds and home
health agencies per 1,000 residents age 65 and older from the Area Health Resource File
(AHRF). We obtain county-year data on the Medicare managed care organization pene-
tration rate from LTCFocus, which includes AHRF data originally from CMS. We con-
struct annual measures of county employment-to-population ratios from US Census Bu-
reau data, namely, County Business Patterns data on the number of employees per county
and intercensal estimates of the county population. We obtain data on the county’s urban
share in 2000 from the US Census Bureau and data on the county’s metro status from
Mable/Geocorr 2000.
In additional analysis, we examine several other quality measures and ameasure of res-
ident days. The first two quality measures are counts of life safety deficiencies and health
less than one-third or more than three times the median of previous years). Documentation from LTCFocus
(Datadictionary.xlsx, row 235) specifically notes: “Facilities report the number of Registered Nurse (RN)
hours during the two weeks prior to their annual survey. CMS converts the number of hours into full-time
equivalents (based on a 35-hour work week) and this is what is reported on the annual OSCAR or CASPER
data. We convert the FTEs back into hours, by multiplying by 35, and divide the total number of RN hours
by the number of residents in the facility (also drawn from the OSCAR or CASPER) to arrive at the RN hours
per resident day (HPRD). We also clean this variable when the FTEs reported are implausible. We set to
missing when total FTEs are 995 or higher or if there are more RN and LPNs reported than the number
of beds in a facility. We also verify staffing variables based on a facility’s data from previous years and impute
based on previous data if staffing levels are less than 1/3 the median of previous years or greater than 3 times
the median, for example. For county and state this is the average RN HPRD among all facilities.”
12 Given the importance of having accurate measures of facility-specific changes and the county-level na-
ture of these data, we validated the county code in LTCFocus against two other sources of nursing facility
data with county codes: CMS Skilled Nursing Facility Cost Reports and Nursing Home Compare. For most
facilities, the three sources listed the same county. For cases where discrepancies existed across the three
sources, we conducted manual lookups of street addresses to obtain the correct county.
13 In cases in which Nursing Home Compare data were missing, we used the LTCFocus data to fill in the
missing values.
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deficiencies, respectively.14 We obtain these variables from the Nursing Home Compare
Calendar Year Provider Standard Surveys andDeficiency Files fromCMS, which are based
on monthly extracts of the OSCAR database. Since the unit of analysis in each calendar
year’s data is the survey, not the provider, and surveys can be 9 to 15 months apart, we
construct these variables following the procedures in the Online Appendix;. Following
Konetzka et al. (2004) and White (2005), we also examine several Nursing Home Com-
pare quality measures (QMs): these include three measures of the percentage of residents
with pressure ulcers, defined for high-risk long-stay residents, low-risk long-stay residents,
and short-stay residents, plus the share of long-stay residents who were physically re-
strained.15,16 We obtain data on resident days from the SNF Cost Reports following the
procedures described in the Online Appendix;.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the roughly 13,000 facilities in our sample in
2005. On average, facilities report 0.31 hours per resident day for RNs, 0.75 hours per res-
ident day for LPNs, and 3.23 hours per resident day for direct care staff. For comparison,
the minimum federally recommended staffing levels by CMS are 0.75, 0.55, and 4.1 hours
for RNs, LPNs, and direct care staff, respectively (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Ser-
vices 2001).17 The average Medicare share of patient days is 14.5 percent, similar to na-
tional statistics. Across all facilities, the average payment change is a decrease of 0.0014
(that is, 0.14 percent) but as noted in Table 1, there is considerable variation across our
sample. In additional columns of Table 2, we compare facilities experiencing payment
decreases of 1 percent or more and those experiencing payment increases of 1 percent
or more to facilities with more modest or zero payment changes (payment changes rang-
ing from21 percent to 1 percent, including no change). Facilities in all three groups had
similar mean staffing levels in 2005. Facilities with modest payment changes had a lower
Medicare share than those with larger payment changes, but the difference is small
14 Examples of life safety deficiencies (also known as “K-tags”) include inspection citations related to fire
alarms, sprinkler systems, utilities and cook facilities, door design related to smoke/fire, and means of egress,
among others. Examples of health deficiencies (also known as “F-tags”) include citations related to infection
control, accident environment, food safety, quality of care, and pharmacy consultation, among others.
15 We chose these from 15 QMs that were available in 2005 (and thus before the payment change we ex-
amine). Since our identification strategy relies on the payment change that took place in 2006, it is not pos-
sible for us to use other QMs introduced in that year. We construct annual facility-specific measures by
averaging quarterly data obtained from CMS. For 2003, we have only two quarters of Nursing Home Com-
pare QM data; in all other years in our panel we have all four quarters of QM data.
16 Additional long-stay quality measures include the percentage of residents (1) whose need for help with
daily activities has improved, (2) who have moderate/severe pain, (3) who lose control of bowels/bladder,
(4) who have/had a catheter inserted and left in their bladder, (5) who spend most time in a bed or chair,
(6) whose locomotion has worsened, (7) who have a urinary tract infection, (8) who are more depressed
or anxious, and (9) who lose too much weight. Two other short-stay quality measures are the percentage
of residents (1) with delirium, and (2) who had moderate to severe pain. We also estimate models of these
11 measures in a robustness check described in the Section VII.
17 These are recommended minimum staffing levels from a 2001 CMS report (cited in Harrington et al.
2016). Various states have implemented legally binding minimum staffing levels (Bowblis 2011); the state
legal minimum levels are not always expressed in terms of hours per resident day.
AM E R I C A N J O U R N A L O F H E A L T H E C O N OM I C S
424
(14.4 percent compared with about 15 percent). Across the three groups, there are a num-
ber of statistically significant differences in other facility traits such as size, chain status,
and ownership, but these differences are generally small. It is important to note that
our identification strategy relies on within-facility payment changes induced by the geo-
graphic realignment; therefore, all time-invariant facility-specific traits are controlled for.
VII. Results
A. MAIN SPECIFICATION RESULTS
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation 5. In addition to the covariates listed
in the table, the model also includes facility fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-by-year
fixed effects, and a set of interactions between year indicators and the county’s urban share.
The estimated coefficient for the key explanatory variable—interaction of the percentage
payment change, baseline Medicare share, and an indicator for years after the policy
change—is reported in the first row. In all three models, the coefficient estimates for the
key explanatory variable are positive, consistent with payment increases leading to higher
staff hours per resident day. The estimates are statistically significant in the models of RN
and LPN hours per resident day.
To interpret the effect sizes, we simulate the effects of a 5 percent payment increase for
facilities with a Medicare share of 10 percent relative to 0 percent. This is a relatively large
change—only 2.1 percent of facilities have payment changes larger than 5 percent, and a
10 percentage point change inMedicare share is approximately equal to the medianMedi-
care share and its interquartile range. The simulated effects are reported in Table 3 and
show that this 5 percent payment increase raised RN hours per resident day by 9.01 percent
(and LPNhours per resident day by 3.24 percent) in facilities with 10 percent of resident days
paid by Medicare relative to facilities with no Medicare patients. These effects are similar
to responses by Pennsylvania nursing homes to changes inMedicaid payment rates reported
in prior work. Specifically, Hackmann (2019) finds that a 5 percent increase in Medicaid
payments increased skilled nursing staff by 4.35 percent, which lies between our estimates.
Some of the other coefficient estimates reported in Table 3 are statistically significant.
Increases in beds are associated with decreases in staffing hours per resident day, perhaps
explained by scale economies. Staffing is significantly lower for facilities that are part of a
chain, and staffing decreases as Medicare Advantage penetration increases. The estimated
coefficients for the interaction term between the payment change and POST are small for
the LPN and direct-care specifications, suggesting that changes in Medicare payments
have near-zero effects at facilities that do not treat Medicare patients. However, a 5 percent
payment increase is estimated to reduce RN HPRD at zero-Medicare facilities by 0.04,
which is about 13 percent of the mean; our conjecture is that the linear Medicare share
term may be somewhat misspecified in the RNmodel, although we also note that the con-
fidence interval includes quite small effects at zero-Medicare facilities. The estimated co-
efficients for the baseline Medicare share interacted with the POST indicator are negative
and significant, indicating that higher Medicare share nursing facilities decreased staffing
levels in the post period, even for facilities that did not experience changes in the HWI
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Staffing variables
RN hours per resident
day (RN HPRD) 0.305 0.311 0.303 0.317
[0.371] [0.274] [0.387] [0.278]
12,956 1,300 10,856 800
LPN hours per resident
day (LPN HPRD) 0.754 0.748 0.757 0.719c
[0.531] [0.475] [0.550] [0.297]
12,952 1,300 10,852 800
Direct-care staff hours per
resident day (DC HPRD) 3.228 3.304a 3.223 3.168
[0.973] [1.017] [0.983] [0.722]
12,931 1,299 10,833 799
Explanatory variables N 5 12,956 N 5 1,300 N 5 10,856 N 5 800
Change in Medicare
payment (DPayment) 20.0014 20.031a 20.00047 0.034a
Medicare share 0.145 0.149 0.144 0.153b
Facility no. of Medicare/
Medicaid certified beds 110.320 127.210a 108.200 111.700c
Facility is part of a chain 0.563 0.515a 0.574 0.493a
Facility is nonprofit 0.256 0.265 0.260 0.199a
County no. of beds per
1,000 persons age 651 26.308 24.363a 26.542 26.296
County no. of home
health agencies per
1,000 persons age 651 0.254 0.208a 0.261 0.226a
County under age 65
share of the population 0.865 0.863 0.865 0.869a
County female share
of the population 0.508 0.511a 0.508 0.509a
County African American
share of the population 0.115 0.139a 0.111 0.128a
County Hispanic share of
the population 0.110 0.100a 0.113 0.097a
County pop. share with
income < 100% FPL 0.131 0.139a 0.130 0.133
County Medicare
Advantage penetration rate 12.006 9.774a 12.615 7.365a













(1) (2) (3) (4)
County employment-to-
population ratio 1.404 1.237a 1.423 1.416
Additional quality variables
Number of life safety
deficiencies 3.887 2.988a 3.973 4.193
[3.975] [3.340] [4.010] [4.260]
12,712 1,285 10,650 777
Number of health
deficiencies 6.745 6.454 6.690 7.985a
[5.637] [5.350] [5.590] [6.490]
12,712 1,285 10,650 777
Mean share of high-risk
long-stay residents with
pressure ulcers (QM 303) 13.54 14.46a 13.32 14.93a
[6.30] [6.39] [6.25] [6.55]
9,474 1,017 7,896 561
Mean share of low-risk
long-stay residents with
pressure ulcers (QM 304) 2.59 2.41b 2.59 2.82c
[2.36] [2.18] [2.37] [2.56]
7,204 820 5,940 444
Mean share of short-stay
residents with pressure
ulcers (QM 314) 18.46 19.81a 18.25 18.99b
[8.24] [8.38] [8.27] [7.28]
9,330 1,000 7,781 549
Mean share of long-stay
residents who are physically
restrained (QM 311) 6.93 6.77 6.88 7.83a
[7.36] [6.97] [7.40] [7.63]
11,985 1,224 10,036 725
Note: Means, standard deviations (in brackets), and sample sizes are reported. Samples exclude
government-owned and in-hospital nursing facilities and facilities with missing data for RN
HPRD or the explanatory variables in the regressions. Superscript letters in columns 2 and 4 re-
port whether the mean in each column is significantly different from the mean in column 3.
aindicates significance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the 10% level. Large payment in-
creases (decreases) are defined as increases (decreases) of 1% or more. Small payment changes are
defined as those greater than 21% and less than 1%.
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TABLE 3. Effects of payment changes on staffing, main specification
RN HPRD LPN HPRD DC HPRD
(1) (2) (3)
DPayment # Post # Medicare Share 5.665a 5.023a 5.278
(1.713) (1.886) (5.388)
DPayment # Post 20.816a 20.238 20.442
(0.303) (0.353) (0.929)
Post # Medicare Share 20.293a 20.331a 20.245b
(0.073) (0.081) (0.110)
No. of certified beds (facility) 20.001a 20.002a 20.004a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Chain (facility) 20.008c 20.008 20.028c
(0.004) (0.010) (0.016)
Nonprofit (facility) 0.002 0.011 0.027
(0.013) (0.026) (0.027)
Beds/1,000 age 651 (county) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
HH/1,000 age 651 (county) 20.026 20.059 20.064c
(0.029) (0.057) (0.037)
Share < age 65 (county) 0.220 0.313 21.810c
(0.482) (0.708) (1.081)
Share female (county) 0.157 20.699 20.464
(0.527) (0.881) (1.575)
Share Afr. Amer. (county) 20.764b 0.088 22.021
(0.308) (0.864) (1.400)
Share Hispanic (county) 20.539 0.181 1.614
(0.342) (0.434) (1.149)
Poverty share (county) 20.081 20.231 -0.008
(0.129) (0.220) (0.370)
MA penetration rate (county) 20.001c 20.001 20.003b
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Emp.-pop. ratio (county) 0.011 0.002 0.023
(0.023) (0.042) (0.086)
Dependent mean 0.314 0.775 3.252
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase
in the Medicare payment rate 9.01 3.24 0.81
AM E R I C A N J O U R N A L O F H E A L T H E C O N OM I C S
428
from the geographic realignment. Online Appendix Figure A1; examines this in more de-
tail by plotting mean RN, LPN, and DC HPRD over time and by quartiles in Medicare
share. The differential trends shown in the figure are consistent with the regression results.
For example, average RN and DC HRPD increased over time for facilities in quartiles 1
through 3 of the Medicare share distribution, but fell for facilities in the top quartile of
Medicare share. For LPN HPRD, average hours rose for facilities in all quartiles, but rose
to a lesser extent for facilities in the top quartile of the Medicare share distribution. The
large coefficient estimates for the POST#Medicare share interaction are not a threat to
identification, since our identifying variation comes from plausibly exogenous geography-
based payment changes, rather than Medicare intensity alone.
Because staffing is measured in terms of hours per resident day, we check whether the
staffing results in Table 3 are simply driven by changes in resident days. That is, if payment
increases had reduced volume, this would have mechanically increased hours per resident
day. Although such an effect is counter to the traditional supply-side response of profit-
maximizing firms, it could occur if facilities engage in demand inducement whenMedicare
payments fall. As a check, we estimate equation 5 where the dependent variable is the log of
total resident days. Table 4 reports the results; the estimated coefficient is small and statis-
tically insignificant. Thus, changes in resident days do not explain the observed changes in
staffing hours per resident day.
B. EVENT STUDY SPECIFICATIONS
We next report the results from an event study specification in which we allow the effect
of the payment change interacted with Medicare share to vary by year. This allows us to
test the key identifying assumption in our models, which is that in the absence of the
HWI-induced payment changes, the unobserved differences in staffing between facilities
that experienced payment changes and those that did not would be the same over time,
among high Medicare share facilities relative to low share ones. For this specification, we
replace the interaction term DPaymenti#POSTt#Medicare Sharei in equation 5 with
a series of interaction terms between a dummy variable for each year of our sample and
TABLE 3. Continued
RN HPRD LPN HPRD DC HPRD
(1) (2) (3)
Number of facilities 13,203 13,203 13,202
Number of observations 76,862 76,835 76,696
Note: The table reports the results from estimating equation 5. For covariates, each cell reports
the coefficient estimate and the robust standard error of the estimate clustered by unique MSA-
CBSA pairings (in parentheses). All models also include facility fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-
by-year fixed effects, and a set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the county’s
urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid certified beds.
The percentage change in HPRD is interpreted for a standard increase in the Medicare payment
rate, which is defined as a 5% rise in Medicare payment for facilities with a Medicare share of 10%
relative to 0%. aindicates significance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the 10% level.
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DPaymenti#Medicare Sharei. We omit the interaction term for 2005, the year before the
geographic change, as the base year. We also include the 2006 data and allow the model to
test directly for differential effects across the transition year and other post-change years.
We plot the estimated interaction term coefficients from these specifications in Fig-
ure 4, and the results are supportive of the causal effects we report in Table 3. We test
for support of the parallel trend assumption by looking at the coefficient estimates for
the interaction of DPayment and Medicare Share in the pre-period. The small point esti-
mates for 2004 and 2005 suggest that there were not significant differential staffing pre-
trends between positive Medicare share facilities experiencing payment changes and zero
Medicare share facilities experiencing payment changes. Further, increases in Medicare
payment interacted with Medicare share had significant positive effects on RN and LPN
hours per resident day in the post period (p < 0:10).
C. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
As noted above, the geographic change we study affected Medicare payments to hospitals
too, because the HWI is also used to adjust hospital payments up or down by differences in
labor costs across areas. Although the results from Shin (2019) showed no evidence that
hospital admissions, length of stay, or readmissions were affected by the HWI change,
we might be concerned that the payment change led to some other change in hospital be-
havior that could have implications for post-acute care in SNFs, and thus for facility staff-
ing levels. To address this concern, we constructed a measure of the average hospital HWI
change between 2004 and 2008 across hospitals located in each SNF’s hospital service area
and controlled for that measure. Specifically, we added two interaction terms to our ex-
planatory variables in equation 5: (1) the change in the area average hospital HWI multi-
plied by POST and Medicare share, and (2) the change in the area average hospital HWI
multiplied by POST.18 The results are reported in Table 5. The coefficients on the additional
TABLE 4. Effect of payment changes on resident days
Log (total resident days)
DPayment # Post # Medicare Share 20.636
(1.029)
Number of facilities 12,403
Number of observations 66,893
Note: The table reports the results from estimating a variation of equation 5 in which the depen-
dent variable is the log of total resident days, instead of a measure of staffing. For brevity we re-
port only the key coefficient estimate from the model and its robust standard error clustered by
unique MSA-CBSA pairings (in parentheses). The model also includes the full list of covariates
reported in Table 3, plus facility fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and a
set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the county’s urban share. Observa-
tions are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid certified beds.
18 We use CMS Hospital Impact Files to construct this measure. For each hospital, the change in HWI is
measured as the post-reclassification HWI in 2008 minus the post-reclassification HWI in 2004.We average
HWI changes for hospitals located in the same hospital service area (HSA), weighting by hospital beds, and
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interaction terms are not statistically significant in any of three staffing models, while the
coefficients on our key explanatory variable, the facility-specific payment change inter-
acted with POST and Medicare share, are largely unchanged. Here, the simulated effects
of a five percent payment increase (for 10 percent relative to 0 percent Medicare share fa-
cilities) are statistically significant, implying 8.16 percent and 3.44 percent increases in RN
HPRD and LPN HPRD, respectively.
Our main estimates are also robust to other changes in the controls (results available
upon request). Compared with the results shown in Table 3, the effect sizes are somewhat
larger when we exclude all time-varying facility controls (nonprofit ownership, being part
of a chain, number of beds) from the models. Here, simulated effects of a 5 percent pay-
ment increase (for 10 percent relative to 0 percent Medicare share facilities) are a 9.4 per-
cent rise in RNHPRD and a 3.54 percent rise in LPNHPRD (both statistically significant).
Estimates change by very little when we add interaction terms between each of the year
indicator variables and a metro area indicator for the county, instead of county urban
share. We estimate slightly smaller effect sizes when we exclude state-by-year dummy var-
iables from the set of controls, given concerns of overfitting the model by including the
large set of state-by-year dummies. Here, simulated effects of a 5 percent payment increase
(for 10 percent relative to 0 percentMedicare share facilities) are an 8.78 percent rise in RN
HPRD and a 3.06 percent rise in LPN HPRD (both statistically significant).
Our identification strategy exploits differences in facility exposure toMedicare share in
the period prior to the payment change; this approach may produce biased estimates if fa-
cilities with higher Medicare shares make staffing adjustments differently from facilities
with lower Medicare share. For example, some high Medicare share facilities may special-
ize in rehabilitation services and as a result may have different staffing needs. We address
this concern in three ways. First, our main analysis deals with this indirectly by excluding
in-hospital SNFs from the estimation sample because those SNFs treat a disproportion-
ately large share of Medicare patients. The mean Medicare share in in-hospital SNFs is
32.3 percent, more than twice as large as our sample average of 14.5 percent; for one-quarter
of in-hospital SNFs, the Medicare share is 80 percent or more, compared with only 0.5 per-
cent of SNFs in our sample.19
Second, we estimate our main specification (equation 5) using a sample that excludes
facilities with Medicare shares greater than or equal to 70 percent. The results are reported
in Table 6, and are very similar to the main sample results. The bottom row shows that
the same large simulated payment increase led RN hours per resident day to increase by
7.02 percent and LPN hours per resident day to increase by 4.02 percent, compared with
9.01 percent and 3.24 percent (respectively) in the full sample.
merge the average changes to each nursing facility in our sample by the facility HSA. The HSA is a unit of
geography used in the Dartmouth Atlas Project. It reflects local markets for hospital care. We use the 2008
post-reclassification HWI since a large share of hospitals petition or receive adjustments to their HWI values
between 2004 and 2007. We note that for a number of SNFs in our data set, we were unable to construct this
measure because of missing data in the Impact Files. SNFs to which we were unable to assign a hospital HWI
change are located predominantly in small areas, which is consistent with the fact that Critical Access Hos-
pitals are exempted from PPS payment.
19 Descriptive statistics pertain to the sample of SNFs in 2005.
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FIGURE 4. Effects of payment changes on nurse HPRD by year. The points
plotted in the figures are the estimated coefficients of the interaction of
DPayment # Medicare Share with individual year dummy variables for each
year in our sample. We omit an interaction term for 2005, the year prior to the
payment change. The brackets show the 90% confidence interval for the point
estimate. The dashed drop lines indicate the start and end of the transitional
year before the CBSA-based HWI was fully implemented. A: Dependent variable
is RN HPRD. B: Dependent variable is LPN HPRD. C: Dependent variable is DC
HPRD. A color version of this figure is available online.
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Third, we report the results from estimating equation 6 below for subgroups of facilities
with similar Medicare shares:
yit 5 g DPaymenti#POSTt 1 b1Xit 1 gi 1 tt 1 lst 1 εit (6).
In this equation, identification of payment changes comes from comparing changes in fa-
cility staffing before and after the payment change across facilities with different size pay-
ment changes, and the estimated coefficient on the double interaction term gives the effect
of the payment change. Note that this model does not rely on the variation in Medicare
share for identification. Instead, we estimate this model for three subgroups of facilities
defined by tercile in Medicare share. The results are reported in the first three panels of
Table 7. For comparison, the fourth panel contains the full sample results; Online Appen-
dix Table A1; reports the full model results for the full sample. Results from the RNHPRD
models lack the necessary precision to show a clear relationship, but they suggest that ef-
fects vary byMedicare share. In contrast, we find that the simulated large payment increase
led to comparably sized 3.2 to 4.3 percent increases in LPN HPRD in facilities with high,
middle, and low shares of Medicare patients. The effects are statistically significant for fa-
cilities in the middle and top terciles.We then estimate analogous event study specifications.
TABLE 5. Effects of facility payment changes on staffing, controlling for area
average hospital payment changes
RN HPRD LPN HPRD DC HPRD
(1) (2) (3)
DPayment # Post # Medicare Share 5.206a 5.422b 4.905
(2.006) (2.150) (5.899)
D Area Hospital HWI # Post # Medicare Share
20.610 0.549 0.369
(0.380) (0.441) (1.471)
D Area Hospital HWI # Post 0.271 20.357 20.362
(0.198) (0.221) (0.730)
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate 8.16 3.44 0.75
N 66,203 66,175 66,055
Note: The table reports the results from estimating a variation of equation 5 in which two addi-
tional controls are added: the interaction of the change in the area average hospital wage index
with POST and the triple interaction of the change in the area average hospital wage index, POST,
and Medicare share. We report coefficient estimates from the model and the robust standard
errors of the estimates clustered by unique MSA-CBSA pairings (in parentheses). All models also
include the full list of covariates reported in Table 3, plus facility fixed effects, year fixed effects,
state-by-year fixed effects, and a set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the
county’s urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid certi-
fied beds. The percentage change in HPRD is interpreted for a standard increase in the Medicare
payment rate, which is defined as a 5% rise in Medicare payment for facilities with a Medicare
share of 10% relative to 0% aindicates significance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the
10% level.
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The results are reported inOnline Appendix Figures A2–A5;.While the confidence intervals
are large in these specifications, we find little evidence of differential staffing trends byMedi-
care payment change prior to 2005. Online Appendix Figures A2B and A3B; show that pay-
ment increases raised LPN HPRD in high and medium Medicare share facilities. The in-
crease appears to remain throughout our sample period (through 2009) in high Medicare
share facilities but dissipates beginning in 2008 for medium Medicare share facilities. One
drawback of this alternative identification strategy is that the policy variation is exclusively
location based and does not use the variation resulting from the differential exposure across
facilities.
D. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
As shown in Table 1, the geographic realignment led to payment increases and decreases of
varying sizes. In this section, we examine whether staffing responses varied by the direction
and size of the payment change. We test for asymmetric and nonlinear responses to pay-
ment changes by estimating equation 7:
yit 5 a1Large Increasei # POSTt # Medicare Sharei 1 a2Small Increasei # POSTi
#Medicare Sharei 1 a3Small Decreasei # POSTt # Medicare Sharei
1a4Large Decreasei # POSTt # Medicare Sharei 1 a5Large Increasei
#POSTt 1 a6Small  Increasei# POSTt 1 a7Small Decreasei # POSTt
1 a8Large Decreasei#POSTt 1a9POSTt#Medicare Sharei 1 b1Xit 1 gi 1 tt 1 lst 1 εit
(7).
TABLE 6. Effects of payment changes on staffing, excluding SNFs
with Medicare share > 70%
RN HPRD LPN HPRD DC HPRD
(1) (2) (3)
DPayment # Post # Medicare Share 4.342b 6.195a 7.234
(1.920) (2.164) (6.373)
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate 7.02 4.02 1.12
N 76,327 76,300 76,172
Note: The table reports the results from estimating equation 5 on the sample of facilities with
Medicare share less than 70%. For brevity we report only the key coefficient estimate from the
model and its robust standard error clustered by unique MSA-CBSA pairings (in parentheses).
All models also include the full list of covariates reported in Table 3, plus facility fixed effects, year
fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, and a set of interaction terms between year indicator vari-
ables and the county’s urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/
Medicaid certified beds. The percentage change in HPRD is interpreted for a standard increase in
the Medicare payment rate, which is defined as a 5% rise in Medicare payment for facilities with
a Medicare share of 10% relative to 0% aindicates significance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level,
and cat the 10% level.
ð7Þ.
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TABLE 7. Effects of payment changes on staffing, double interaction
specification results by Medicare share
RN HPRD LPN HPRD DC HPRD
(1) (2) (3)
A. SNFs in top tercile of Medicare share
DPayment # Post 0.244 0.742b 0.439
(0.290) (0.304) (0.567)
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate 3.22 4.28 0.63
N 25,823 25,797 25,716
B. SNFs in middle tercile of Medicare share
DPayment # Post 0.085 0.518c 0.571
(0.260) (0.276) (0.807)
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate 1.52 3.39 0.90
N 26,065 26,059 26,036
C. SNFs in bottom tercile of Medicare share
DPayment # Post 20.278 0.449 20.184
(0.235) (0.365) (0.577)
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate 24.91 3.23 20.29
N 24,974 24,979 24,944
D. Double interaction specification: Full sample
DPayment # Post 0.090 0.565a 0.402
(0.193) (0.198) (0.379)
% change in HPRD for a 5% increase in the
Medicare payment rate 1.43 3.64 0.62
N 76,862 76,835 76,696
Note: The table reports the results from estimating equation 6. For covariates, each cell reports
the coefficient estimate and the robust standard error of the estimate clustered by unique MSA-
CBSA pairings (in parentheses). All models also include facility fixed effects, year fixed effects,
state-by-year fixed effects, and a set of interaction terms between year indicator variables and the
county’s urban share. Observations are weighted by facility number of Medicare/Medicaid certi-
fied beds. The percentage change in HPRD is interpreted for a standard increase in the Medicare
payment rate, which is defined as a 5% rise in Medicare payment for facilities with a Medicare
share of 10% relative to 0%. aindicates significance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the
10% level.
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This specification replaces the continuous measure of payment change from equation 5
with a set of four indicator variables for whether the facility experienced a large payment
increase, small payment increase, small payment decrease, or large payment decrease, with
zero change being the omitted category.We define large payment changes as those that are
greater than or equal to 1 percent in absolute value, and small changes as less than 1 per-
cent in absolute value. The results are reported in Table 8. The signs of the estimated co-
efficients suggest that payment increases usually raise staffing while payment decreases
usually reduce staffing, and there is evidence that both large and small payment changes
matter. In the RN models, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient
of the payment increase term is equal to that of the payment decrease term, for both small
and large decreases. Thus the effect seems to be symmetric for payment increases and de-
creases. However, for LPN and DC models, the evidence is mixed. This exercise may un-
derscore the limited statistical power of our analysis when we cut the data too thinly.
Finally, we examine whether Medicare payment increases are associated with changes
in other measures of quality. To examine this, we estimate equation 5 using several annual
TABLE 8. Tests for nonlinear asymmetric effects of payment changes
on staffing
RN HPRD LPN HPRD DC HPRD
(1) (2) (3)
Large (1%1) payment increases # Post # Medicare Share 0.339a 0.502a 0.217
(0.102) (0.161) (0.338)
Small (0%–1%) payment increases # Post # Medicare Share 0.281c 0.133 20.339
(0.168) (0.203) (0.260)
Small (0%–1%) payment decreases # Post # Medicare Share 20.366c 20.305 20.538c
(0.199) (0.222) (0.290)
Large (1%1) payment decreases # Post # Medicare Share 20.057 0.110 20.498
(0.171) (0.160) (0.328)
p-value from the hypothesis test that large increases and
decreases have an equal-sized effect 0.238 0.037 0.579
p-value from the hypothesis test that small increases and
decreases have the same effect 0.770 0.629 0.039
Number of facilities 13,203 13,203 13,202
Number of observations 76,862 76,835 76,696
Note: This table reports the results from estimating equation 7. For covariates, each cell reports
the coefficient estimate and the robust standard error of the estimate clustered by unique MSA-
CBSA pairings (in parentheses). All models also include the interactions of large/small payment
increases/decreases with POST, the interaction of POST and Medicare share, plus the time-
varying facility and county traits shown in Table 3 and facility fixed effects, year fixed effects, and
state-by-year fixed effects. aindicates significance at the 1% level, bat the 5% level, and cat the
10% level.
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facility-level measures of quality as dependent variables in separate regressions. Specifically,
we model the number of life safety deficiencies, the number of health deficiencies, the per-
centage of residents with pressure ulcers (among high- and low-risk long-stay residents
and short-stay residents), and the percentage of long-stay residents who are physically re-
strained. The results are reported in Table 9. The coefficient estimates for the main explan-
atory variable, the triple interaction between change in payment, baseline Medicare share,
and the POST indicator, are not statistically significant in any of the models. Admittedly,
measures like life safety deficiencies are based on characteristics of the facility’s physical
plant, which may be slow to change. Further, only one of these additional measures is spe-
cific to short-stay residents, so we have limited ability to test whether Medicare payment
increases translated to quality improvements specific to Medicare patients.20
VIII. Conclusions
We use a novel strategy to identify the causal effects of facility-specific Medicare payment
changes on nursing home staffing. We find that increases in Medicare payments led facil-
ities to increase nursing staff hours per resident day. Specifically, RN and LPN hours per
resident day increased by 9.01 percent and 3.24 percent respectively in response to a 5 per-
cent rise in Medicare payment, for facilities with 10 percent of resident days paid byMedi-
care relative to those with zero Medicare patients. Our results are robust to various spec-
ification changes, including a flexible event study specification that provides support for
our identifying assumption of parallel trends in the pre-period data. The increases in staff-
ing hours per resident day do not arise mechanically from decreases in resident days.
To put our estimates’magnitudes in context, consider the following back-of-the-envelope
calculation that connects a hypothetical Medicare payment increase to nurse payroll spend-
ing. For this exercise, we consider a 5 percent increase in the Medicare per diem payment
rate; given that the averageMedicare per diem in our sample in 2005 was $262, this amounts
to an increase of $13.10. Further, we used the Current Population Surveys during our sam-
ple period to calculate the mean hourly wages of RNs and LPNs working at nursing homes;
these costs are $22 and $17, respectively. Ourmain coefficient estimates in Table 3 imply ave-
rage effects on RN and LPN hours per resident day of 0.028 (5:665#0:05 # ½0:120:0)
and 0.025 (5:023#0:05# ½0:120:0), respectively, at facilities with 10 percent Medicare
share relative to facilities with zero Medicare share. Multiplying by average wages per hour,
those effect estimates imply increased spending on RNs and LPNs of $0.62 and $0.43 per res-
ident day, respectively. Taking RNs and LPNs together, a SNF with 10 percent Medicare
share would spend $1.05 more on staffing out of the $13.10 reimbursement increase relative
to a SNF with zero Medicare share. This suggests that 8 percent of the payment increase is
transferred directly to spending on patient care through staffing. Note that our measure of
20 In a robustness check, we also estimated models in which each of the 11 other individual QMs (includ-
ing two other short-stay measures) served as the dependent variable in a separate regression. In only one case
was the coefficient of the main explanatory variable statistically significant (the share of long-stay residents
feeling depressed or anxious), and the sign of the coefficient was positive, which runs counter to expectations.
The results are available upon request.
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staffing applies to the entire facility, not just nursing staff who deliver care to Medicare
patients.
Staffing is a structural measure of quality; we also tested whether payment decreases
were associated with a range of measures that represent other measurable dimensions
of quality, including process and outcomes of care. We found little evidence that other
measures of quality improved as payments rose. In this way, our work is also similar to
other papers that have examined the impact of Medicare payment changes on nonstaffing
measures of quality. For example, prior studies on the effects of Medicare payment rates
on other dimensions of quality have also failed to identify significant changes in facility
inspection deficiencies, pressure sores, and restraint use (Konetzka et al. 2004; White
2005). It remains possible that the staffing changes we identified affected unmeasured
or unobservable quality dimensions (Werner, Konetzka, and Kruse 2009).
Our study has several limitations. First, although we have a strong identification strat-
egy, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the HWI shocks to facilities could be
endogenous. For example, the shocks are geographically related and could be incidentally
correlated with other local changes. We do, however, control for facility fixed effects and
urban population share interacted with year dummy variables. In an alternative specifica-
tion we control for a facility’s metro status with year dummy variables, and our results are
very similar. Second, we examine a one-time policy shock that occurred in 2005, so one
may question the generalizability of our results to the current debate about Medicare pay-
ment reform and nursing home quality shortcomings. We acknowledge the lack of exter-
nal validity, but we note the typical trade-off between external validity and internal valid-
ity. Third, our measures of staffing are reported by facilities and prone to measurement
error (e.g., Castle 2008). Medicare has only recently begun to release the payroll data that
nursing homes are required to report under the ACA (Rau and Lucas 2018); as far as we
know, no other facility-level sources of administrative data on staffing are available nation-
wide. Additionally, the staffing measures we use, as well as some of the other quality mea-
sures reported in Table 9, are not specific to Medicare. It is possible that facility responses
to Medicare payment changes occur on payer-specific dimensions of quality. Fourth, the
studied shock to HWI for most facilities induces a somewhat small impact on Medicare
payment. We however note that those seemingly small price shocks may be quite impor-
tant for the profit margins of nursing homes, and could plausibly lead to important facility
responses. Finally, our analysis focuses on staffing responses; another type of facility re-
sponse to changes in financial incentives is to engage in upcoding (e.g., Bowblis and Brunt
2014). Shin (2019) reports that hospitals engaged in upcoding in response to the same type
of payment shock we examine. Whether nursing facilities act similarly is a question for
future research.
Our findings have important implications for public policy. Future Medicare payment
policy recommendations should carefully consider the evidence that Medicare reimburse-
ment cuts could lead to reduced staffing levels. This is especially important in light of rec-
ommended and actual cuts to PPS payment rates. For example,MedPAChas recommended
freezing or reducingMedicare payments under the SNF PPS in each of the past 10 years, and
in 2010, the ACA authorized $200 billion inMedicare payment cuts over 10 years (MedPAC,
various years; Congressional Budget Office 2010). Such payment cuts can significantly
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reduce health-care providers’ reimbursements; indeed, CMS estimates that the ACA
cuts will result in negative margins for half of all hospitals and two-thirds of skilled nurs-
ing facilities by 2040 (Heffler et al. 2016). Our results suggest that such changes, and the
important changes under way as the new SNF Value-Based Purchasing Program imposes
financial penalties on some facilities and rewards others, could have important and uneven
impacts on nursing home resident experiences.
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